Behavioural economics of organization: employees and managers

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dc.contributor.authorHoudek, Petr
dc.contributor.authorKoblovský, Petr
dc.contributor.otherEkonomická fakultacs
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-21
dc.date.available2017-03-21
dc.date.issued2017-03-15
dc.description.abstractThis short perspective article presents an overview of empirical evidence on the behavioural organizational economics on the basis of the extended standard model of worker's behaviour. The advancements of behavioural economics theories, new detailed and structured data on actions of economic actors, and increasingly used fields experiments provide a strong basis for the creation of more precise and more robust models of the behaviour of employers and employees. In this article we analyse 4 stylized extensions of standard model of worker's behaviour. Firstly, we give several examples of worker's reference dependent decision-making. Secondly, we utilize Akerlof’s hypothesis on the relationship between an employer and an employee which is as predicted very reciprocal, similarly to the gifts exchange paradigm. We show that the more the employee thinks s/he is trusted by the employer, the harder and more efficiently s/he works. Thirdly, we show several instances of the importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in employees and how those two motivations interfere with each other and crowd each other out in some situations. The research shows that meaningfulness of the work can be a significant driver of the employees’ efficiency as well. In the last section devoted to employees we provide evidence on the impacts of relative performance compensation on cooperation, reciprocity, and sabotage in firms. The last part is devoted to analysing behavioural regularities of managers in their day-to-day decision-making. The overview briefly expands particularly on their over-optimism and on their possibly undeserved remuneration resulting from random events and market changes rather than from the managerial skills. The article concludes by proposing possible directions for further field research.en
dc.formattext
dc.format.extent4-15 s.cs
dc.identifier.doi10.15240/tul/001/2017-1-001
dc.identifier.eissn2336-5604
dc.identifier.issn1212-3609
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.tul.cz/handle/15240/19852
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTechnical university of Liberec, Czech Republicen
dc.publisherTechnická Univerzita v Libercics
dc.publisher.abbreviationTUL
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dc.relation.ispartofEkonomie a Managementcs
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics and Managementen
dc.relation.isrefereedtrue
dc.rightsCC BY-NC
dc.subjectbehavioural economicsen
dc.subjectfirm cultureen
dc.subjectfield experimentsen
dc.subjectgift exchangeen
dc.subjecthubrisen
dc.subjectCEOen
dc.subjectintrinsic and extrinsic motivationen
dc.subjectloss aversionen
dc.subjectreference-dependence modelen
dc.subjectreciprocityen
dc.subjectsocial preferencesen
dc.subjectwageen
dc.subjectlabouren
dc.subject.classificationC93
dc.subject.classificationD86
dc.subject.classificationJ41
dc.subject.classificationM54
dc.titleBehavioural economics of organization: employees and managersen
dc.typeArticleen
local.accessopen
local.citation.epage15
local.citation.spage4
local.facultyFaculty of Economics
local.fulltextyes
local.relation.abbreviationE+Mcs
local.relation.abbreviationE&Men
local.relation.issue1
local.relation.volume20
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