Coalition governments and inflation in central and eastern Europe countries

Title Alternative:Rządy koalicyjne i inflacja w krajach europy środkowej i wschodniej
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dc.contributor.authorPotluka, Oto
dc.contributor.authorKlazar, Stanislav
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-13
dc.date.available2017-10-13
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractČlánek se zabývá politicko-ekonomickými vazbami koaličních vlád v zemích střední a východní Evropy. Analýza dat odhalila statisticky významný vliv politické většiny na pokles inflace o 0,22 procentních bodů (za každé 1 % většiny vlády v parlamentě). Vlády sestavené z jedné strany a vlády minimální vítězné koalice (všechny strany ve vládě jsou nezbytné pro vytvoření většiny v parlamentu) statisticky významně ovlivnily inflaci ve srovnání s jinými typy vlád. V takovém případě byl pokles inflace přibližně o 3 procentní body.cs
dc.description.abstractArtykuł dotyczy powiązań polityczno-gospodarczych rządów koalicyjnych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Analiza danych wykazała statystycznie znaczący wpływ większości politycznej na spadek inflacji o 0,22 punkty procentowe (dla każdego 1 % większości rządu w parlamencie). Rządy utworzone przez jedną partię polityczną oraz rządy koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich (wszystkie partie polityczne w rządzie są niezbędne do stworzenia większości w parlamencie) miały statystycznie znaczący wpływ na inflację w porównaniu z innymi typami rządów. W takim przypadku spadek inflacji wynosił około 3 punktów procentowych.pl
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with the political-economic relationships of the coalition governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The benefit of this paper is in its approach to testing the relationship of the political and economic characteristics in the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe, especially for coalition governments. This approach has rarely been applied in recent literature. We used panel regression with fixed effect. Data revealed that the level of the incumbent government’s majority in parliament is statistically significant and that the estimates showed a tendency of inflation to decrease by 0.22 percentage points in the case when the majority of the coalition increases by 1 percent. Single-party government and government with a minimal winning coalition (all parties in the government are necessary to form a majority in parliament) statistically significantly influenced the inflation even more and in comparison with other types of government, decrease the inflation by approximately 3 pp. There were also statistically significant estimates for public expenditure and economic growth. The inflation estimate increased in the case of an increase in public expenditure or an increase in economic growth in Central and Eastern European Countries. Both relationships are predictable. The number of political parties did not appear statistically significant in any of the tested models. The same situation appeared in the case of the variable concerning the prime minister belonging to the strongest political party in the coalition government.en
dc.description.abstractDer Artikel befasst sich mit den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bindungen der Koalitionsregierungen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas. Die Datenanalyse hat einen statistisch bedeutsamen Einfluss der politischen Mehrheit auf den Inflationsrückgang um 0,22 Prozentpunkte (für jedes 1 % der Regierungsmehrheit im Parlament) entdeckt. Im Vergleich mit anderen Regierungsarten haben die von einer einzigen Partei gebildeten Regierungen sowie Regierungen einer knapp siegenden Koalition (alle Regierungsparteien sind für die Parlamentsmehrheit unentbehrlich) die Inflation statistisch bedeutsam beeinflusst. In einem solchen Fall beträgt der Inflationsrückgang 3 Prozentpunkte.de
dc.formattextcs
dc.format.extent11 stran
dc.identifier.eissn1803-9790
dc.identifier.issn1803-9782
dc.identifier.otherACC_2013_2_09
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.tul.cz/handle/15240/21033
dc.language.isoen
dc.licenseCC BY-NC 4.0
dc.publisherTechnická univerzita v Liberci, Česká republikacs
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dc.relation.ispartofACC Journalen
dc.relation.isrefereedtrue
dc.subjectCoalition governmentsen
dc.subjectCentral and Eastern European Countriesen
dc.subjectEconomic policyen
dc.subjectInflation Monetary policyen
dc.subjectPanel dataen
dc.subjectGovernment ideologyen
dc.subject.classificationE52
dc.subject.classificationE58
dc.subject.classificationD72
dc.subject.classificationC23
dc.titleCoalition governments and inflation in central and eastern Europe countriesen
dc.title.alternativeRządy koalicyjne i inflacja w krajach europy środkowej i wschodniejpl
dc.title.alternativeKoaliční vlády a inflace v zemích střední a východní Evropycs
dc.title.alternativeKoalitionsregierungen und Inflation in den Ländern mittel- und Osteuropasde
dc.typeArticleen
local.accessopen
local.citation.epage107
local.citation.spage97
local.fulltextyesen
local.relation.issue2
local.relation.volume19
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