Coalition governments and inflation in central and eastern Europe countries

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dc.contributor.author Potluka, Oto
dc.contributor.author Klazar, Stanislav
dc.date.accessioned 2017-10-13
dc.date.available 2017-10-13
dc.date.issued 2013
dc.identifier.issn 1803-9782
dc.identifier.other ACC_2013_2_09
dc.identifier.uri https://dspace.tul.cz/handle/15240/21033
dc.description.abstract Článek se zabývá politicko-ekonomickými vazbami koaličních vlád v zemích střední a východní Evropy. Analýza dat odhalila statisticky významný vliv politické většiny na pokles inflace o 0,22 procentních bodů (za každé 1 % většiny vlády v parlamentě). Vlády sestavené z jedné strany a vlády minimální vítězné koalice (všechny strany ve vládě jsou nezbytné pro vytvoření většiny v parlamentu) statisticky významně ovlivnily inflaci ve srovnání s jinými typy vlád. V takovém případě byl pokles inflace přibližně o 3 procentní body. cs
dc.description.abstract Artykuł dotyczy powiązań polityczno-gospodarczych rządów koalicyjnych w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej. Analiza danych wykazała statystycznie znaczący wpływ większości politycznej na spadek inflacji o 0,22 punkty procentowe (dla każdego 1 % większości rządu w parlamencie). Rządy utworzone przez jedną partię polityczną oraz rządy koalicji minimalnie zwycięskich (wszystkie partie polityczne w rządzie są niezbędne do stworzenia większości w parlamencie) miały statystycznie znaczący wpływ na inflację w porównaniu z innymi typami rządów. W takim przypadku spadek inflacji wynosił około 3 punktów procentowych. pl
dc.description.abstract This paper deals with the political-economic relationships of the coalition governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The benefit of this paper is in its approach to testing the relationship of the political and economic characteristics in the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe, especially for coalition governments. This approach has rarely been applied in recent literature. We used panel regression with fixed effect. Data revealed that the level of the incumbent government’s majority in parliament is statistically significant and that the estimates showed a tendency of inflation to decrease by 0.22 percentage points in the case when the majority of the coalition increases by 1 percent. Single-party government and government with a minimal winning coalition (all parties in the government are necessary to form a majority in parliament) statistically significantly influenced the inflation even more and in comparison with other types of government, decrease the inflation by approximately 3 pp. There were also statistically significant estimates for public expenditure and economic growth. The inflation estimate increased in the case of an increase in public expenditure or an increase in economic growth in Central and Eastern European Countries. Both relationships are predictable. The number of political parties did not appear statistically significant in any of the tested models. The same situation appeared in the case of the variable concerning the prime minister belonging to the strongest political party in the coalition government. en
dc.description.abstract Der Artikel befasst sich mit den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bindungen der Koalitionsregierungen in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas. Die Datenanalyse hat einen statistisch bedeutsamen Einfluss der politischen Mehrheit auf den Inflationsrückgang um 0,22 Prozentpunkte (für jedes 1 % der Regierungsmehrheit im Parlament) entdeckt. Im Vergleich mit anderen Regierungsarten haben die von einer einzigen Partei gebildeten Regierungen sowie Regierungen einer knapp siegenden Koalition (alle Regierungsparteien sind für die Parlamentsmehrheit unentbehrlich) die Inflation statistisch bedeutsam beeinflusst. In einem solchen Fall beträgt der Inflationsrückgang 3 Prozentpunkte. de
dc.format text cs
dc.format.extent 11 stran
dc.language.iso en
dc.publisher Technická univerzita v Liberci, Česká republika cs
dc.relation.ispartof ACC Journal en
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dc.subject Coalition governments en
dc.subject Central and Eastern European Countries en
dc.subject Economic policy en
dc.subject Inflation Monetary policy en
dc.subject Panel data en
dc.subject Government ideology en
dc.subject.classification E52
dc.subject.classification E58
dc.subject.classification D72
dc.subject.classification C23
dc.title Coalition governments and inflation in central and eastern Europe countries en
dc.title.alternative Rządy koalicyjne i inflacja w krajach europy środkowej i wschodniej pl
dc.title.alternative Koaliční vlády a inflace v zemích střední a východní Evropy cs
dc.title.alternative Koalitionsregierungen und Inflation in den Ländern mittel- und Osteuropas de
dc.type Article en
dc.relation.isrefereed true
dc.identifier.eissn 1803-9790
local.relation.volume 19
local.relation.issue 2
local.citation.spage 97
local.citation.epage 107
local.access open
local.fulltext yes en
dc.license CC BY-NC 4.0


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